DCCUMENT RESUME

ED 153 567 HE 009 889

AUTHOR Rabinoff, Marc A.
TITLE The Collective Bargaining Movement in Higher Education: A Chronological Analysis and Review of the Factors, Consequences and Trends, 1961-1977.
PUB DATE 77
NOTE 108p.

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.83 HC-$6.01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Collective Bargaining; *College Faculty; Educational Finance; Governance; *Higher Education; Historical Reviews; *Literature Reviews; *Teacher Administrator Relationship; Tenure; *Unions

ABSTRACT

A review of 30 studies concerned with the possible factors, consequences, and trends of the collective bargaining movement in higher education is presented. Three general factors are revealed as being instrumental in influencing faculties in the collective bargaining movement in higher education: financial factors, governance factors, and job security factors. Other factors noted in the literature include the political views of the faculty and self-interest and philosophical beliefs of faculty about unionism. Viewpoints concerning the possible consequences of collective bargaining in higher education ranged from the potentially positive features of collective bargaining to the seriously detrimental effects of unionism on the structure, governance, salaries, and future of our existing institutions of higher education. A definite trend towards faculty unionization in higher education was observed, especially from 1969 to 1975. A chronological analysis of the collective bargaining movement in higher education from 1961 to 1977 is provided. (SPG)

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ED153567

The Collective Bargaining Movement In Higher Education: A Chronological Analysis and Review of The Factors, Consequences and Trends, 1961-1977

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TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) AND USERS OF THE ERIC SYSTEM

by

Marc A. Rabinoff, Ed.D.
Assistant Professor of Physical Education and Recreation
Metropolitan State College
Denver, Colorado

HE 009 889

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To provide faculty, administrators and the general public with a base to understand the collective bargaining movement in higher education, the following literature areas were examined:

1. The issues and factors relating to the collective bargaining movement in higher education.
2. The possible consequences of the collective bargaining movement in higher education.
3. The trends of collective bargaining in higher education.
4. A chronological analysis of the collective bargaining movement in higher education from 1961-1977.

The Issues and Factors Relating to the Collective Bargaining Movement in Higher Education

According to Carlton and Goodwin (1969), collective bargaining (called collective negotiations or professional negotiations) is viewed as a process whereby governing boards and their administrative representative discuss and make mutual determinations of educational policy, economic policy and working conditions in negotiations with the teaching staffs. As part of collective bargaining, Duryea and Fisk (1972) included salaries, terms and conditions of employment and other matters related to a group's interest. Ladd and Lipset (1973) see collective bargaining as evidence of the move away from elitism in education:

> From the broadest perspective, the rapid growth of collective bargaining in higher education during the past half decade should be seen as an extension to the level of university governance and faculty life, of the powerful trends toward equalization, and away from elitism, that have characterized many sectors of American society since the mid-sixties. (p. VII)

Others view the demand for collective bargaining as the result of administrative tyranny (Davis, 1969). In partial agreement with Davis (1969), Mayhew (1969) stated that an alert faculty at Columbia University, anxious to determine policy, became involved in policy decisions only after the historical system of governance showed itself unable to deal with student unrest. Similarly, a careful clinical study by Mayhew (1969) of 30 institutions having curricular problems showed a central problem to be the failure of the administration to keep up with the institution's growth.

Participation in governance is one issue strongly considered by faculties, according to Aussieker and Garbarino (1973). Similarly, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973) found that faculties wanted more control over employment and external authorities with a voice in the decision-making process. For example, one of the major causes for the unionization at Monmouth College in New Jersey, according to Schinagl (1972), was the typical ivory tower

leadership which was autocratic and patterned by unilateral downward communications. This same concern was mentioned by the faculty at Saint Leo College (1975) which claimed the administration disregarded the recommendations of faculty and others concerning long-term planning reports. The seemingly unilateral decisions made by administrators also caused unrest. Lussier (1974) also points out the faculty's perception of decreasing input into the decision-making process at Albion College which led to a representative election. However, Albion College voted "No Agent," and chose an alternative to solve their problems.

This concept of autocratic administration was mentioned by Finken (1971) when he stated that "should the history of an institution reflect a pattern of autocratic administration, it is doubtful that the faculty could lose much in the way of participation (if they engaged in collective bargaining)" (p. 161). In agreement with Finken (1971), Marmion (1969) mentioned the lack of a deeply-rooted system for faculty participation in decision-making concerning the educational functions of the institution was reason enough for collective bargaining in some institutions. He further stated that more and more lay faculty at church-related institutions want to participate in the decision-making process of education. Interestingly, Lipset and Ladd (1971) saw that stronger American colleges and universities have never been bureaucratic institutions in which a hierarchy of administration passed down the decisions.

Further examination of the issue of arbitrary decisions revealed a pattern of arbitrary decisions which led to the formation of the faculty union at Southeastern Massachusetts University, as noted by Means (1976a). This same situation existed at Saint John's University, as Hueppe (1973) pointed out where the faculty wanted to participate in decision-making due to arbitrary dismissals by the administration. They also wanted to secure a voice in determining their own destiny in the wake of ever-increasing national entrenchment in almost all areas of higher education.

The power, or lack of power, of faculty senates and councils in relation to governance has been a factor leading to the creation of unions on many campuses. Carr and Van Eyck (1973), in examining the 1969 study by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, found that faculty who supported unions were dissatisfied with senior professors and their roles on faculty senates. This suggests that the differences in the level of participation in governance might account for the differences in the propensities of faculty to unionize in different sectors of higher education. They also noted that, in general, faculty participation is clearly greater in private institutions than in public institutions.

A 1967 pioneer study of "Faculty Discontent," sponsored by the American Association of Higher Education and cited by Garbarino (1975), concluded that:

> The main source of discontent are the faculties' desire to participate in the

> determination of those policies that affect its professional status and performance and in the establishment of complex, statewide systems of higher education that have decreased local control over important campus issues. (p. 1)

Furthermore, Garbarino (1975) felt that in large comprehensive university systems the question of "parity" between faculty at different academic levels and other professional staff causes a serious problem, leading to an interest in the collective bargaining movement.

Agreeing with Garbarino (1975) on the issue of statewide systems, Boyd (1971) stated that the development of statewide systems and new bureaucracies designed to control higher education has affected the independence of universities and their former authority. Furthermore, Marmion (1969) noted the evolution of former normal schools to teacher colleges, then to multi-purpose institutions and finally to statewide systems has caused a tremendous power struggle for control. Wollett (1971) makes similar assertions about the impact of statewide systems of higher education:

> The establishment of statewide systems of higher education has had a sharp impact on the role of the faculty on the individual campus, even on those campuses which have well functioning procedures for faculty representation,

> consequently many faculty members have become restive over the loss of control that they once thought was theirs. (p. 8)

On the other hand, Begin (1972) stated after surveying four-year colleges, there was no evidence to support a conclusion that collective bargaining has led to a significant dismantling of any traditional institution-wide or system-wide procedures of governance such as those in senates or faculty councils. However, Kugler (1969a) agreed with Carr and Van Eyck (1973) in stating that due to power hierarchies in colleges and universities, faculty councils and senates have become a part of an elaborate academic charade with the final decisions made by administrators and trustee groups.

Threat to institutional autonomy has also helped to stimulate interest in collective bargaining. Schuster (1974) maintained the most crucial issues surrounding the collective bargaining movement are those of institutional governance. These issues must be resolved or the fragile academy may suffer irreparable harm in future years.

Shulman (1974) found that some institutions have separated governance issues from union contracts, as also mentioned by Means and Semas (1976b), but there is doubt this can continue. Union members, according to the researchers, agree that academic and economic issues are too closely related to be separated.

Similar to the findings by Means and Semas (1976b), Olsen (1974) observed a serious and widespread faculty

involvement with governance. However, much of Olsen's efforts has been in the area of procedural and jurisdictional questions rather than substantive matters. One example of the anomalous situation that can result, says Olsen, occurs when functional roles are obscured during certain procedures in the search, screening, selection and even retention of presidents and other administrators. The criteria used by faculty in such judgements represent the interest of the faculty. However, this situation is inconsistent with the president's role as manager of college affairs and the criteria are not ones by which presidents or other administrators should be judged. Rather, the administrator should be evaluated by his capacity to fulfill the imperatives of management such as planning, coordination and organization. An institution, according to Olsen, cannot exist while in an adversarial position, as in collective bargaining, since this kind of confrontation inevitably involves a struggle for power and thus poses a direct threat to academic freedom and its integrity.

In an A.A.U.P. (1971-72) bulletin, the roles of faculty in the hiring, evaluation and retention of administrators are, by nature of their responsibilities, more directly dependent on faculty support. For such positions, it is therefore the role of the faculty to aid in the search, especially when the position has direct influence for the faculty. The president and board must make the final choice, but sound academic practices dictate that they not choose a person over

the reasoned opposition of the faculty. In any event, principal administrators should not be dismissed for any reason without significant involvement of the faculty of an institution. This is to secure the rights and interests of all parties.

Governance issues are also examined by Means and Semas (1976b) who cite a study by the National Institute of Education which found that faculty unions and academic senates have struck an uneasy balance in an effort to control governance on campus. The researchers sent questionnaires to 17,000 individuals, more than 240 non-union institutions and 300 unionized ones. From this study they concluded that where they co-exist with unions, faculty senates exercise similar influence at two-year and four-year institutions with slightly greater influence found among senates at four-year institutions. In institutions with both senates and unions, unions are stronger in economic matters, and senates retain influence over academic areas. However, unions in these situations have little influence over long-range planing.

Howe (1971) viewed the concept of senates in a different light. He stated, "An Academic Senate seems to pose the best chance for defining collective negotiations in flexible ways and for keeping alive the idea that bargaining is a second-best alternative to which, unfortunately, events have forced us" (p. 132). Similarly, Weber (1967) and the Carnegie

Commission on Higher Education (1973) assert that academic senates are the ideal vehicles for dealing with faculty and administrative problems. His reasoning for preferring a strong senate is that as an external organization, unions were seen to be a threat to educational institutions as they tended to interfere with professional goals. According to Marmion (1969), an institution with a strong faculty senate, democratically elected and functioning as a meaningful partner in the educational enterprise, will not need collective bargaining.

McConnell (1971) noted the degree of participation in senate committees is relatively limited. The most powerful committees are heavily weighted with people at the top ranks. With these administrators in power, change or reformation can hardly occur. Additionally, in these institutions collegiality is almost impossible.

Collegiality, as a factor of the operations of senates and unions in higher education, is another important issue in the collective bargaining movement. McConnell (1971) stated the factors of size and increasing professionalization of faculty are leaving only vestiges of collegiality in faculty government. In most of our large institutions, there are few evidences of an academic community; perhaps collegiality exists in departments, but departments now have so many specialists that communication may not really exist.

In defining collegiality, Bloustein (1973) stated that collegiality is related to the rights, powers and duties of a

group of people which arise out of these common pursuits. However, he continued that collegiality is not a result of unions, but of other fundamental changes in academic life.

Means (1976a) saw the concept of collegiality as a myth. There has, he asserts, been no real coming together between faculty and administration; therefore, collective bargaining has broken down this myth and replaced it with formal procedures. Mayhew (1969), in agreement with McConnell (1971) and Means (1976a), viewed a sense of anomie in faculties. For instance, he points out that faculty members do not socialize and in some departments do not even speak to each other. The American Federation of Teachers in their pamphlet "AFT on Campus" (1969) stated that they doubted collegiality ever existed and felt only through collective bargaining could conflicts between employer and employees be resolved.

Misconceptions and distorted perceptions by faculty about the job of administrator and the administrator's view of his faculty have caused some of the interest of the faculty in collective bargaining. This viewpoint was examined by Euwema (1961) who found that in general the chief academic administrator's complaint was that faculty did not take their responsibilities seriously enough e.g., advising duties. On the other hand, faculty felt that the administration was responsible for their low pay, insufficient office space and lack of appreciation of the nature of the university, stressing quantity instead of quality. He concluded by stating:

> If everyone recognizes what everyone else is expected to contribute to the university community, he may not therefore love his fellow man more: but he may learn to respect them. In this instance that is just as good. (p. 193)

Lipset and Ladd (1971) viewed the American professoriate as an extraordinarily diverse assortment of professionals, very much divided collectively and individually about what they and their institutions should be doing. They contend that if academes were less politically minded, then the university could be fairly manageable, but when the professors are the collective decision makers, then fragmentation of the academy seems inevitable.

As observed in the diversity of faculty positions, the universities now reflect the pluralism of contemporary society which is replicated on our campuses and contained in our pluralism of goals. This opinion of Boyd's (1971) is also held by Keeton (1975) who mentions not only differences in religion or philosophical perspectives exist but also differences in the characteristics of students or supporters and innovators as part of the pluralism of society and universities.

The fiscal stringencies of academic life have forced governing boards to take closer looks at the budgets and operations of educational institutions. This was seen as a factor relating to collective bargaining, but not a

consequence thereof, by Bloustein (1973) who noted similar governing board actions at Bennington College without a union and at Rutgers University with a union. Furthermore, the financial plight of higher education institutions in the 1970's was seen by Tyler (1971-72) to cause a "speed up" in universities by administration. The "speed up" refers to the pressure put on employees as employers try to squeeze out the most from the worker. However, this has not happened in great numbers in education as observed by Carr and Van Eyck (1973) who found that in general, faculties have not been required to accept greater work loads in return for higher salaries.

A study by Boyd (1971) indicated even high salaries caused discontent. Malamud (1972) mentioned that as college professors viewed the public school teachers' tremendous gains, they wanted the similar gains for themselves even though their salaries were generally higher than in public school. Kugler (1969b) and Marmion (1969) noted in agreement with Malamud (1972) that as university professors see their public school colleagues make substantial gains in workload adjustment, improved compensation and in decision-making through collective bargaining, they feel that collective bargaining can perhaps work for them.

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973) reported that budgetary support for faculty interests was becoming harder to obtain, while at the same time the rise in the cost of living exceeded increases in faculty salaries

causing a reduction in purchasing power. Yet, Dorfman (1976) found that faculty generally had fared better than non-educators as a result of inflation in a depressed economy.

According to Ladd and Lipset (1976b), most of the colleges rejecting collective bargaining were privately supported, a fact that may reflect faculty judgements that their unions are less apt to secure salary increases. This view was corroborated by Garbarino (1975) who observed that the well-known financial difficulties of private colleges and universities and the lack of a tax-based source of funding may discourage faculties from seeking unions as an effective lever for financial gains. He also pointed out that wages might be a cause for faculty to unionize in the public sector, not in the private.

At two private colleges, however, Saint Leo College (1975) and Monmouth College (1972), salaries were an issue and both colleges have voted to unionize. Moreover, Albion College, also a private college mentioned by Lussier (1974) where salaries were an issue, found that the faculty's desire to give a new dean of academic affairs a chance to change things resulted in a "No Agent" victory vote. Michigan State University was seen to have two major factors leading its faculties to collective bargaining elections, salaries and unions themselves, as noted by Lozier (1974).

Blackburn (1971) and Provost (1971) saw the tight money situation and oversupply of Ph. D's as speeding the trend towards collective bargaining in higher education. Provost,

chairman of The Academic Senate of the California State Colleges, said, "If Governor Reagan succeeds in keeping the budget pretty much intact as he presented it to the legislature, then we will have to face collective bargaining" (p. 38).

One union, the United Faculty of Florida (U.F.F.), mentioned that salaries as well as tenure and academic governance were issues, but not one word about education for the student was mentioned in its statement, as noted by Sherer (1976). The merit pay controversy was viewed as an issue in studies by Marmion (1969), Hedgepeth (1974) and Boyd (1971) which showed a definite influence on faculties' propensities to unionize.

According to Tyler (1971-1972), as of 1969, only 49% of faculties had tenure and those untenured did not want the tenured to decide on their fate, thus making these faculties very interested in collective bargaining and the job security it may bring. Similarly, Masters (1975) stated the rationale for teacher job security through legislation was based largely upon the need to insulate educators from political patronage. He also mentioned that job security presented a need for collective bargaining which strengthened the organization as the representative of the teachers.

Marmion (1969) also found that the abolition of traditional methods of tenure and promotion caused an increase in the desire of faculties to unionize. Lozier (1974) found that administrations who interfered in procedures for tenure, promotions and appointments forced faculties toward collective

bargaining to gain job security by way of tenure. Administrators began to terminate tenured faculty without due process, which only reinforced the faculties' contention that collective bargaining was the answer. This same factor of tenure and job security was observed by Sherer (1976) and The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973) as important issues in the collective bargaining movement in higher education.

As mentioned earlier by Lussier (1974) another issue causing a union election was that of job security. This same situation was observed by Means and Semas (1976b) when they found that faculties in their 20's and 30's, hired in the 1960's when colleges were growing, are now coming up for tenure but may find it difficult to get due to less money and declining enrollments. They also found that all public and private universities and public four-year colleges, along with 93% of the private four-year colleges, had tenure systems as of 1974.

An interesting factor in the collective bargaining movement in higher education involves the quality of institutions and their relationships with the appearance of unionism. Although the concept of the college and university as a place for scholars is being re-examined and redefined as observed by Kugler (1969a), unionization, according to The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973), Begin (1972) and Garbarino (1975) does not seem to be a significant movement in our prestigious academic institutions.

Such institutions may be unionized only as a protective rather than an aggressive act because of the constant pressure from legislative control. This same concept was noted by Garbarino (1975), when he mentioned that large public universities such as Michigan University and University of California will be slow in unionization, if they unionize at all. Moreover, Begin (1972) stated that institutions with long-standing policies on governance and structure are not easily converted to collective bargaining situations.

Frankie and Howe (1969) saw this issue of quality reflected in community colleges where faculties see themselves as good as administrators and as worthwhile as their four-year school colleagues. This view was studied in depth by Boyd (1971) who commented that an "inferiorty complex" exists in certain sectors of American higher education, especially in junior colleges. Additionally, the professors at these schools feel (as stated by Mayhew, 1969) a marginal status in academic life, thus producing uncertainty and discontent as well as a search for scapegoats. This makes faculties antagonistic to deans and presidents who are seen as villans or become targets of the anger of faculty.

According to Aussieker and Garbarino (1973), the common assumption that unionism has been concentrated in relatively low-quality institutions is true. Despite this pattern, the authors state there is room for some skepticism as to the significance of the quality variable as an explanation of unionism. In 1976, Ladd and Lipset found that academic

unionism was still primarily a phenomenon of the lower tier of academe. They found that:

> Faculty employed in the lower tier of academe in terms of scholarly benefits, financial resources and economic benefits-and those who are in the lower ranks, lack tenure, and who are younger are much more likely to favor organized collective action... Those who perceive themselves on the political left (on both community and campus issues)...are more likely to endorse collective bargaining and faculty strikes and to view increased unionization as a good thing. (1976b, p.16)

Two researchers, Hueppe (1973) and Hedgepeth (1974), mentioned collective bargaining law changes as a factor causing the increase of unions on campus. For example, the Taylor act of 1967 in New York made it almost mandatory for public colleges and universities to enter into collective bargaining negotiations. Additionally, the passage of a 1969 New York state Labor Relations Act permitting collective bargaining at private non-profit institutions motivated some faculties to seek collective bargaining contracts.

Reflecting on some of the issues and factors, Bloustein (1973), a college president, stated:

> In my judgement, the fears many have expressed concerning the development of academic collective bargaining are grossly exaggerated. I do not say there is no reason for concern. But, on balance, my advice to any college or university president is to welcome and support a collective bargaining contract which provides for negotiations of economic issues and insures, through a grievance procedure, academic due process, while also guaranteeing the integrity of current collegial practices in respect of appointment and promotion and the development of academic policy. (p. 187)

Possible Consequences of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education

According to Blackburn (1971), the positive features of collective bargaining potentially outweigh the negative. His logic for this conclusion concerned the oversupply of Ph. D.'s which can raise the talent level of weaker universities, who normally could not hire them.

Some early studies by Davis (1969) and Frankie and Howe (1969) mentioned that if collective bargaining techniques are to be employed, they should be directed toward the establishment of the various forms of institutional government which will permit faculties to more completely fulfill their

roles in the world of academe. Collective bargaining, as of 1969, had failed to evidence a creative impulse and failure to illustrate the contributory effects of its propcnents claims. It seemed to be concerned primarily with the distribution function and sharing of available power and resources. Moreover, concerning the consequence of distribution of resources, Kasper (1970) found that there was not a significant wide-spread allocation of funds as a result of collective bargaining.

Kugler (1969) saw collective bargaining as a give-and-take process where divergent opinions and perceptions are accomodated and changed into a working relationship in the form of a written agreement. Since this positive consequence can occur, faculties will be encouraged to overcome anxiety about status and identity when unionism hits the campus. They will have to recognize it as a natural institutional instrument, ideally suited for the collective effort.

McConnell (1971) agrees with Kugler (1969b) but asserts that both faculty and administration will lose and gain power in a complex readjustment of structure. The most profound effects of collective bargaining will be on the factor of governance, such as the changes of roles for senates and authority chain of commands. McConnell (1971) and Kugler (1969b) saw the conditions of appointments, promotions and tenure, which traditionally were handled by senates, becoming items for unions and management to decide.

Dealing with the governance factor and the give-and-take

concept of collective bargaining, Hepler (1971) saw the evolvement of teams designed to control the give-and-take process. These teams, however, must demonstrate a high level of responsibility in relationship to educational goals and unions which may be more and more common in American higher education. Interestingly, the author mentioned that Central Michigan University, which has a union, received after negotiations only moderate rather conservative gains in salary and other benefits.

Means (1976a) cited John Fitzgerald, president of the Faculty Federation at Southeastern Massachusetts University, as stating that their union is a "moderate" one, in that it has concentrated solely on issues of working conditions and academic life of its members.

> A notion still in currency is that academic and economic issues are easily distinguishable. It is believed in some quarters that the bargaining process will be confined to economic issue and that academic issues may be relegated to existing governance bodies such as faculty senates or councils and the like. Thus, the bargaining agent will have jurisdiction over the economic issues and governance bodies will determine academic policies. In light of experience to date, however, this seems an unrealistic analysis since the scope of bargaining has

> encompassed both academic and policy issues customarily handled by faculty senates, as well as purely economic matter.
> (McHugh, 1971, p. 84)

The problem in sharing the governance of institutions in higher education was observed by Ianni (1974). A "That's your problem syndrome," seemed to exist because of the great bureaucracy system of governance. Furthermore, Ianni asserts, administrators must immediately focus attention on matters of governance or the system will seem more deficient than it is. The author based his conclusions on the circumstances surrounding the events following collective bargaining in Pennsylvania's state-owned system of higher education. According to the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973), collective bargaining should be an amendment to the existing forms of governance. For instance, collective bargaining provides agreement upon rules of behavior, contracted understandings and mechanisms to handle disputes as well as grievance procedures and to manage conflicts. Researchers see three basic choices for the future for governance of institutions of higher education: co-determination, collective bargaining, or some combination.

Howe (1972) and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973), viewed collective bargaining as a process which may be the best method of resolving conflicts because it evolves in a democratic context. Its effects may seem revolutionary, but its product is agreement, even if it is

adversary-based and not collegial in nature. Howe noted that the major distinction between the process inherent in collective bargaining and in a collegial relationship is the pursuit of compromise, not consensus. This concept of the adversary relationship inherent in collective bargaining was seen by Wollett (1973) and Corson (1975) as a factor to be considered in the long range consequences and impact of collective bargaining in higher education. Wollett (1973) stated that the faculty who make informal decisions for collective bargaining should be made aware of the adversary relationship, so both faculty and administration could benefit from the relationship.

Olsen (1974) believed that institutions of higher education cannot exist in an adversary relationship between faculty and administration. For instance, Hedgepeth (1974) found that after negotiations in the New York state system (especially at Cortland State University), an internally and externally segmented situation was developed. Additionally, personnel problems and the roles of all parties were adversely affected, which seemed to outweigh the opportunity gains in the agreement.

Although Bylsma and Blackburn (1972) also found impersonality between faculty to have increased in many situations, they noted that other consequences had resulted, such as a more representative, but more tightly structured and bureaucratic system. Additionally, the organization was more democratic, as the faculty now participated in decision-making

and greater faculty control in welfare issues like salary, class size, contracts, workload and time assignments for teaching. These conclusions were drawn by the authors in a study that looked at Michigan Community Colleges through use of interviews and questionnaires sent to union, non-union and administrative personnel. On the other hand, Boyd (1973) found that the impact of collective bargaining caused an increase in board power at the expense of faculty power, and personnel policies became more formal and more subject to review as well as more uniformed and centralized. Furthermore, there was a trend to go back to a line-item budget system by some administrators to guard funds against bargaining demands.

Angell (1974) studied the results of many collective bargaining situations and found both advantages and disadvantages can occur as a result of negotiations. Some of these advantages found included efficiency, equality of power, legal force, impasse resolutions, increase in communication, a definition of policy and rights, faculty compensation, self-determination and an increase in institutional loyalty and consistency of service strengthening collegiality. Some of the disadvantages included increased costs, loss of flexibility, inappropriateness of job actions, increased bureaucracy, unfavorable power shifts, increases in adversary relationships, increased faculty demands, diminished university autonomy, loss of student rights, involuntary contributions, and loss of traditional faculty rights

as well as self-determination and credibility.

Duryea and Fisk (1972) also found some advantages and disadvantages to collective bargaining that included as advantages the improvement of the decision-making process, stronger grievance procedures and new policies on tenure, and such disadvantages as the possibility of the state defining a more precise method of accountability (concurrent with opinions of Boyd, 1973, and Corson, 1975). This concept of accountability may include faculty jobs, sabbaticals, loans and student-teacher ratios. Another serious consequence of collective bargaining and related to accountability is the difficulty in maintaining a balance of forces (Duryea and Fisk, 1972) between academic autonomy and its supervision and control by the state, since our public colleges are funded by taxpayers.

Boyd (1973) and Blackburn (1971) saw student rights decreasing as faculty rights increased, as well as a decrease in the "elite," i.e., influential faculties' power and status. Boyd (1973) further asserts that collective bargaining is not the cause of problems in higher education, but instead one means of attempting to solve problems between faculty and administration. Finding alternatives to collective bargaining causes much controversial debate in academe. Boyd (1973) stated that educators must either accept collective bargaining and learn to deal with it or find alternatives to solve academic problems in an effort to minimize any adverse impact on our system of education.

As alternatives to collective bargaining, Weber (1967) recommended sharing authority for institutional policy, faculty and administration complementing their roles in the decision-making process, and the idea that academic senates remain the best vehicle for dealing with faculty and administrative problems. In agreement with Weber (1967), Kugler (1969a) stated that among alternatives was the "no organization" faculty, who philosophically are opposed to collective bargaining. In reality, according to the author, collective bargaining is nothing more than a process of representative democracy in action. This same concept was held by researchers (American Council on Education, 1972) who studied the role of faculty in budgetary and salary matters. They found that the faculty should participate both in the preparation of the total institutional budget and in decision-making regarding further appropriation of its specific fiscal areas.

According to Corson (1975), collective bargaining will result in the reduction of the autonomy of public institutions and the loss of faculty identity. Furthermore, the egalitarianism of unions will wipe out the conditions which gave distinction and status to some teachers in the past. In a search for a workable mode of governance for the 1970's and 1980's, the author asked five questions which must be answered if institutional governance is to survive:

1. Do the unique characteristics of the college or university as organizations require new structural

arrangements to provide efficient means for the expression of opinion and/or participation in decision-making of groups which have had little voice in decision-making?

2. Should the processes of decision-making be made more explicit and more visible to all who are affected by those decisions?
3. Are the established structures for faculty decision-making and student government to be destroyed as new ones are considered or will they continue?
4. What power will trustees and presidents have if student and faculty power increases?
5. What method of accountability of all groups in the decision-making process needs to be established as structural changes occur?

In conclusion, Corson (1975) commented that the resulting system of governance can be expected to mobilize the efforts of a vast variety of individuals who share common goals.

Tice (1973), in a study similar to Corson's (1975), performed an experiment at the University of Michigan to find an alternative or model of governance without collective bargaining. The author found that collective bargaining was not new there, as it had been existed informally through adhoc committees. A workable alternative model to collective bargaining must, according to the author, fulfill at least one of two conditions: it must achieve the same gains in compensation as collective bargaining, possibly with

fewer risks and disadvantages, or it must provide advances in shared governance sufficient to make collective bargaining undesirable. For widespread use, the model must be adaptable to diverse institutional settings. Additionally, its strengths would rest on its ability to improve skills of all concerned in an atmosphere of collegiality which permits a clear, firm joining of views with a minimum of bitterness. Moreover, the relationship of governance and collective bargaining and its alternatives must be viewed in long-term perspective as related to educational goals. However, solid alternatives have yet to be worked out.

Garbarino (1975) concluded that collective bargaining has been the impetus for institutional, functional and environmental changes, which can have grave consequences for institutions of higher education. For example, institutional changes have included the expansion into multi-campus institutions in the public sector, but not in the private sector. This lack of change in the private sector is viewed as a result of the relatively simple organizational structure of private colleges, as well as the organizational stability they enjoyed during a period of proliferating multi-campus institutions in the public sector. Functional changes were also observed by Hodgkinson in a 1971 study which found that about 40% of all institutions of higher education made some kind of functional change between 1962 and 1966. Functional changes were measured in terms of degrees granted and the variety of programs offered. Environmental changes involved

the desire of faculty to participate in all matters concerning their environment.

Bodner (1974) pointed out that the final contract agreement for the University of Hawaii was totally unacceptable to its faculty, a fact known to faculty members at New York University Law School, which might have led to the "no agent" victory at the New York University Law School. On the other hand, Hueppe (1973) noted some significant gains in the final contract agreement at Saint John's University. Among the gains were a 25% increase in faculty benefits, better grievance procedures, better terms of promotion and tenure, good emphasis on collegiality and a greater formulation by faculty in the decision-making process. Schinagl (1972) stated that some possible consequences of the union negotiations at Monmouth College would contain a favorable pay scale, use of an evaluating team (instead of hand-picked professors) and greater communication and participation between faculty and administration on college matters.

Lussier (1974) mentioned that at Albion College, a college which rejected collective bargaining, a solution was found to settle differences between faculty and administrators. In this situation the faculty voted to give the new dean a chance to change certain factors to their approval. The administration also reinstated sabbatical leaves and tuition remission for faculty spouses as well as new evaluation methods of faculty, a grievance committee and a salary

committee which recommended a 5% pay raise across the board.

Shulman (1974) observed that better grievance procedures will impose on faculty and administrators an evaluation system that is more rational and just than before collective bargaining. Establishing grievance procedures was an issue in 1972, according to Lozier (1974) at Michigan State University. This move by the administration proved to be an alternative to any grievance procedure which might have been set up by a collective bargaining agreement. The administration also created the position of Vice-President for Personnel and Employment Relations to solve matters of faculty relations. Because of these changes, the union was rejected in 1974, but as noted by Lozier (1974) the possibility of a union has not gone forever. Furthermore, collective bargaining can result in incompatibility or strikes, which can weaken the institution, but at times strengthen it.

Mortimer and Lozier (1972) viewed incompatibility as occuring in some institutions, but in others a workable, compatible condition will foster a stronger, more effective relationship between all parties. Closely related to incompatibility of parties and a very definite consequence is the use of the strike. According to Moskow (1968), "It should be emphasized, however, that in private employment the strike is widely recognized as the most important weapon of employee organizations . . . In such cases, the strike may be essential to effective bargaining" (p. 194).

Commenting on the consequences of unions on higher

education, McDowell (1972), former president of the A.A.U.P. chapter at Boston University wrote:

> Unions cannot offer tenured professors greater job security since the instances of tenured faculty being fired are almost non-existent . . . The only faculty group a union could really help are the junior, nontenured members, who tend to be exploited both on salary and working conditions, as well as having little job security. Unions might well lead to a higher percentage of these junior members being continued permanently in employment, but at a substantial price--the watering down of academic standards.
>
> (p. B 30)

Duryea and Fisk (1973) stated that whatever the cause of collective bargaining, the resulting consequence is in the form of a total commitment to a type of organizational structure which in turn presents a significant change in the academic milieu.

Trends in the Collective Bargaining Movement in Higher Education

Early studies such as the ones by Frankie and Howe (1969) saw the greatest amount of militancy towards collective bargaining concentrated in two-year community colleges.

Studies by the American Association of Higher Education in 1967, Marmion (1969) and Frankie and Howe (1969) observed that junior colleges and former teacher colleges as the most fertile institutions for union activity.

Bylsma and Blackburn, in a 1971 study of six Michigan Community Colleges, found that the governance policies were undergoing drastic changes due to the union activists becoming more vocal. In their 1972 study, Bylsma and Blackburn again found the same situations but noted that the changes observed in the community colleges were independent of the size of the institution as well as the affiliation and structure of the bargaining unit. Moreover, there existed specialization, tight rules and regulations and more administrators per faculty than before collective bargaining.

Who will lead the union movement in higher education is a very interesting and debatable topic. Finkin (1971) asserts that senior faculty members will lead the movement as they would want to protect the gains already achieved. Conversely, Bylsma and Blackburn (1971), Lipset and Ladd (1971) and Boyd (1971) contended that the young junior faculty will lead the movement to collective bargaining. These researchers viewed the young junior faculty as people with high expectations about their rights and who are concerned about job security. Also these junior faculty seemed to have had a less favorable assessment of administrators than did their senior colleagues. On the other hand, senior

faculty, according to Bylsma and Blackburn (1971), are firm resistors, because unionism means equality of faculty, separation from administration and loss of favoritism. In reality, an old guard advancing the cause for collective bargaining would be highly unlikely.

The data presented in Table 1 present trends towards unionism for all professional staff and include five institutions, with only professional schools and two with only teaching assistants organized as of December 31, 1974.

Garbarino (1975) found that 90% of all organized full-time teaching faculty are in public institutions, although they account for only two-thirds of all faculty. Measured in terms of institutions, only 2% of all private institutions are organized, while 23% of the public institutions have chosen to organize a union. As of 1975, 98% of the private institutions still remain unorganized, as evidenced by the fact that two of every five bargaining elections held in the private sector resulted in victories for the "no agent" choice. Conversely, in more than 200 bargaining agent elections held in the public sector, only three "no agent" victories were won. According to Garbarino, so few private institutions are organized that no significant analysis could be made at this time. He also found the differences in the administrative structure of private and public institutions could be one reason for the lack of organizing in the private sector.

Table 1

Trends in Unions of College and University Faculty

Date	Total Institutions	Total Faculty	Four-Year Institutions	Four-Year Faculty
1966	23	5,200	1	200
1967	37	7,000	2	300
1968	70	14,300	10	3,300
1969	138	36,100	26	16,100
1970	177	47,300	40	23,400
1971	245	72,400	84	45,400
1972	285	84,300	102	54,600
1973	310	87,700	121	57,400
1974	331	92,300	132	60,600

Garbarino, 1975, p. 56

Interpretation of Table 2 should involve consideration of Ladd and Lipset's (1973) opinion that these results correspond to the national pattern on collective bargaining elections. They found that two-thirds of the faculty surveyed ranged from neutral to negative in viewing collective bargaining. The majority of faculty at five-year and two-year systems clearly favor collective bargaining and presumably will vote that way should the California legislative permit organized representation. Prestigious private universities, Stanford and California Institute of Technology, were not included. Hedgepeth (1971) cited a study by Ecker and Baldridge which partly agreed with the results of the Ladd and Lipset (1973) study on faculty attitudes towards collective bargaining. For instance, one-third believed that collective bargaining was the most effective method to influence decisions on their campuses.

Garbarino (1975) cited another Ladd and Lipset study which showed that 56% of the faculty members in four-year institutions supported unionism in 1969, and this figure rose to over 60% in 1972, yet only 14% of the faculty in four-year institutions were represented by unions in 1974. Also mentioned was the fact that in 1969, both public and private college faculty showed the same level of support for the legitimacy of the strike (46%), yet very few private colleges had been organized by 1974. McConnell (1971) noted that unions will develop unevenly among colleges and universities, as indicated in Ladd and Lipset (1973) and Garbarino

Table 2

Level of Importance of Collective Bargaining by California Faculty

School	N	No or Low	Medium	High or Extremly High	Did Not Respond
Private Institutions	(740)	33	32	35	(21)
University of California	(532)	32	24	44	(18)
California State University and Colleges	(1342)	22	16	62	(14)
Community Colleges	(3557)	21	21	58	(19)

Note: The percentages for the different levels of importance are based on the total who answered the question.

Ladd and Lipset, 1973, p. 63

(1975) studies. McConnell (1971) further pointed out that even the institutions which escape unionism and collective bargaining will force its faculty to challenge trustees and administrators and to assert and demand their own autonomy.

Updating their own data, Ladd and Lipset (1976b) mentioned that by the beginning of 1976, bargaining agents had been chosen to represent the faculties of 294 institutions, with over 410 campuses and involving 95,000 faculty members out of more than 600,000 who were employed at unionized schools. Pierce (1972) predicted that while there were only 10,000 faculty members in unions in 1968, in 1972 there were 100,000 faculty in unions. Corson (1975) analyzed the trends toward collective bargaining in higher education and concluded that if the rate of faculty unionization between 1969 and 1975 continues, it is perceivable that by 1980 as many as 1,000 institutions (including community colleges) will be organized with up to 250,000 faculty members. These predictions and projections do not surprise some, since Marmion in 1969 found that 90% of the colleges administrators surveyed saw unions on the horizon, and Kasper (1970) saw unions becoming much more powerful during the next decade as well as being predominately located in the east and midwest urban areas.

The impact of collective bargaining, according to Bylsma and Blackburn (1972), seems to have been more than just casual. Kemerer (1976) concluded that even though unions and senates are at a critical time in their

relationship, it is the nature of unions to expand their areas of concern. If administrators go along with unions on economic matters, then they may continue to safeguard the role of the senate; if not, unions will take over. Staub (1975) illustrated Kemerer's (1976) point by pointing out that N.E.A., A.F.T. and A.A.U.P. are unions which have gone the way of all unions before them in being more concerned about the survival of their own organization than about personal freedom. One result of this trend was seen in some states where extra permissive or mandatory legislation has told educators that they must join and/or pay dues to continue teaching. On the other hand, Sherer (1976) referred to the U.F.F. (United Faculty of Florida) statement that if the union wins the representative election, all will not have to pay dues. This is true according to Florida state law, but Rep. David Barrett has a bill pending which will require non-union members to pay "fees" equal to union dues plus other charges assessed by unions in order to continue to teach.

Roth (1972) saw the trend in unionism as providing the instrument which will refuse to take "no" for an answer from an administration. She stated that, "A decade of proof now provides for a decade of opportunity just ahead" (p. 15). Mortimer and Lozier (1972) did not agree with Roth (1972) about a decade of proof, and noted that any "blanket comments" about the outcome of collective bargaining agreements are out of place.

Boyd (1971) stated that educators will be more apt to see the emergence of unions for presidents and deans in addition to unions for faculties.

> It rarely helps to stave off unionism by burying out, i.e., improving terms and conditions of employment in an effort to dampen faculty interest in unionism. It costs too much. Additionally, if faculty unionism is an idea whose time has come on your campus, this won't work, and it merely "raises the floor" for demands. (Naples, 1976, p. 22)

Naples also mentioned that it may take from six to eight years for institutions to stabilize the effects and relationships of collective bargaining to governance.

A question raised by Frohreick and Zuelke (and mentioned in the Research notes of Phi Delta Kappan, February, 1976) concerns whether or not salaries are increased by collective bargaining. The authors found no significant positive effect was evident on teacher salaries because of collective negotiations in Wisconsin. They pointed out that in the short term, negotiations resulted in initial raises, but now the trend is for salaries to be decreasing. Although this study and studies by Smith (1972) and Thornton (1973) dealt with public school teachers, the impact was important to college teachers as mentioned previously in the discussion of the

Kugler (1969) study. Other researchers, Garbarino (1975) and Means and Semas (1976b) found similar trends relating to salaries and collective bargaining. However, Thornton (1973) commented on Smith's (1972) study stating that it was too microscopic and did not study a comparison of union and non-union teachers as he found that on the district, not system level, collective bargaining did increase salaries more than just minimally. Birnbaum (1976) also found in his study that during a five year period ending in 1973, unionized college faculty received higher salary boosts than teachers at institutions without collective bargaining. However, the small sample (N=39) might have caused some distortions in the statistics on which he based his conclusions.

In services like education, unionization does contribute to earnings, but its effects are not as large. For example, Doeringer (1973) looking at salaries in industry as related to collective bargaining concluded that his empirical findings were consistent with his final analysis that while unionization generally raises salaries, its effects are particularly strong for the poorly educated worker. It seems to increase mobility in craft and production work through adjustments in earnings. Therefore, education cannot look to industry for examples concerning its effects on salaries.

While unions have been most successful at institutions of lesser status as mentioned earlier, a trend for faculty support is seen among the most liberal faculty members, according to Ladd and Lipset (1976a). This seems incongruent

due to the fact that liberalism among faculty members is usually associated with high academic status institutions. On their liberalism-conservative scale, the authors found that 85% of those who placed themselves in the most liberal one-fifth section favored collective bargaining, as compared to 49% of the most conservative one-fifth. It would seem that a trend among "high tier" scholars towards unionism is clearly not due to economic or professional deprivation, but deprivation in their intellectuality. They also found that professors of education usually support faculty unionism, yet as a group are less likely to be politically liberal than those faculty in the social sciences and humanities. One reason for this may be that professors of education relate better and have stronger ties to teachers in the K-12 organized groups represented by the N.E.A. and the A.F.T.

A trend for unions to appeal to the more liberal politically minded faculty should produce more elections for collective bargaining at Ph. D. awarding institutions. This political trend is seen in recent federal and state law changes regulating collective bargaining in both private and public sectors, including education.

State legislation has been critical to the growth of collective bargaining in higher education. Over 30 states now have laws relating to collective bargaining and 40 others have laws pending as of 1975, as reported by James (1975) and Means and Semas (1976b).

There has been a definite trend toward unions having

strong lobbies for federal funds for schools at all levels, as noted by Tyler (1971) when he commented that the unionized professor can stimulate and help guide labor's continuing committment to make a college education available to all in America. Chanin (1975), however, objected to federal collective bargaining statutes because they have a common denominator in a general fear of being usurped by a federal government which seeks to tip the balance of powers, giving the central control (federal) all the power. On the other hand, the author stated that federal intervention occurred only when states were unable to solve their own problems, for instance, in the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. According to the author, the federal government filled the gap of needs created by state inaction. Similarly, Lieberman (1975) stated that we cannot ignore the dangers of a federal bill and must find a way to meet the needs of employees without sacrificing essential managerial ones. If we do not, the author fears, educators will be caught between a federal bureaucracy and the domination of unions.

Many states have enacted definite structures for resolving disputes in the collective bargaining process that, according to James (1975), demonstrated effective public policy can be framed at the state level. These state experiences provide a cultural perspective on current federal proposals, especially if federal law is designed to pre-empt state law. Recent studies, as noted by James (1975), have

pointed out that teacher unions and public officials will somehow work things out for the child's sake, if nothing else.

Commenting on the views of Lieberman (1975), Chanin (1975) and James (1975), Heddinger (1976) observed that these authors did not mention the impact such laws would have on the structure and functions of representative government at local, state and federal levels. These laws could, according to the author, "emasculate" representative government. Heddinger further stated that collective bargaining is a labor relations process, not a process to determine the form, quality or quantity of public service, including education. This process should not be a substitute for the proper functioning of representative government even though it can deal with problems of wages, benefits in both private and public sectors, especially if the process includes a final determination by an administrative agency or an arbitrator.

In March 1975, a federal appeals court in Boston upheld the N.L.R.B.'s jurisdiction over private colleges, thus (according to Means and Semas, 1976b) contributing to a trend of even more faculty interest in collective bargaining. Although professors in private colleges and universities have been covered by the N.L.R.B. since 1970, they tend to be less receptive to collective bargaining. This reluctance to enter into collective bargaining, as noted by Garbarino (1975), may be a result of faculty still feeling the pressure from administration in the form of punitive actions against union activists. In the college setting, discrimination because of

union actions may be hard for faculty members to prove. Finally, Garbarino (1975) concluded that there is little evidence to explain exactly why the private sector has been slow to organize.

Since 1971, the N.L.R.B. has given a tremendous impetus to private colleges to unionize because the private college was included under its jurisdiction at that time. The N.L.R.B. not only gives the faculty of private institutions of higher education the right to organize, but also (according to Gillis, 1971) the option to view each case situation as separate when resolving a collective bargaining dispute. In another ruling noted by Bodner (1974), the N.L.R.B. made the determination that a run-off election can be between the two choices receiving the highest votes, not just between unions.

Showing a trend for nonprofessional groups at private colleges to be represented, Schinagl (1972) mentioned that the N.L.R.B. suspended elections at Syracuse University and Cornell University to establish a collective bargaining unit for nonprofessional groups. Cogen (1976) stated that in the private sector under N.L.R.B. rulings, there are no guarantees in collective bargaining because management is not required to agree to any proposals and is not even required to reach a contract as long as it bargains in good faith. Cogen (1976) also noted that anything on which two parties can agree should become part of the agreement, and anything not agreed on will not appear.

The extent of legislation on public-employee benefits varies from state to state, according to Lieberman (1975), and it is therefore difficult to tell what the benefits will be in the future. In California, for example, a state with no enacted public employee collective bargaining acts, the benefits are substantial as compared to private sector employees with bargaining rights.

Bakalis (1972) reflected on the absence of statutes regarding collective bargaining, such as in Illinois, which results in a crippling of educational services not by stoppage, but by a persuasive and dangerous weakening of the public's confidence in its elected school board as well as employees, due to many debates and chaos between faculty, administrators and parents. Furthermore, Chanin (1975) cited James Harris, former President of the N.E.A., on this same issue of state statutes as saying:

> In some states teachers are engaged in rather sophisticated bargaining regarding "union security," severence pay, class size, and other matters. At the same time, other teachers are still fighting a "foot-in-the-door" battle and merely are attempting to have the school boards set down and talk to them. The interpretation of identical statuatory language has varied considerably, and all too often necessary procedures for recognition, impasse resolution,

> and enforcement of administratible decisions are either non-existent or inadequate. (p. 98)

Mintz (1974) predicted that during the period from 1975 to 1980 as many as one out of every three colleges will experience a demand for faculty collective bargaining. Based on this concept, he established the National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education at C.U.N.Y.'s Baruch College in New York City. In the final analysis, Lozier (1974) concluded that the adoption or rejection of collective bargaining is clearly the choice of the faculty, not the employer.

A CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING MOVEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1961 - 1977

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Euwema 1961	1. Faculty perception of administrators causing low pay for them. 2. Administrators' perception of faculty not doing their jobs seriously.		
Weber 1967	1. Tension between faculty and administrators regarding faculty power. 2. Professionalism. 3. Levels of bureaucracy. 4. Loss of authority.	1. The union can be a threat when it interferes with professional goals.	1. Faculty senate is the ideal vehicle for faculty and administrative problems.
Moskow 1968		1. Strikes are most potent weapons in private employment.	
Davis 1969	1. Administrative tyranny.	1. The establishment of various forms of governance permitting faculty to fulfill their roles in academe.	

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Frankie and Howe 1969	1. A perception of equality between faculty and administrators on the part of faculty at two year institutions.	1. So far, collective bargaining has failed to evidence a creative change. 2. Concerned primarily with the distribution function-sharing of power and resources.	1. The greatest militancy to unionism on two year colleges. 2. A trend toward compromise as opposed to consensus.
Kugler 1969	1. College professors viewing public school negotiations as beneficial. 2. Younger, more liberal professors in college teaching. 3. A natural product of dynamic forces from objective conditions.	1. Faculty will have to overcome anxiety about collective bargaining. 2. A give-and-take relationship will be developed.	1. At this writing the AFT existed on over 200 campuses and over 17,000 faculty.
Marmion 1969	1. Desire for increased salaries. 2. Abolition of traditional methods of tenure promotion. 3. Better working conditions. 4. Merit pay. 5. A lack of a deep-rooted system for faculty involvement.		1. Trend is greatest in Junior and Community Colleges. 2. Former normal schools that have combined to form the multipurpose institutions. 3. 90% of college administrators saw the union on the horizon.

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Mayhew 1969	1. A sense of anomie in faculties. 2. Traditional governance could no longer cope with student unrest. 3. Quality of institutions.		
Kasper 1970		1. Not much effect on salaries. 2. Not a significant widespread allocation of resources.	1. Collective bargaining will be big in East and Midwest, in large urban areas. 2. Collective bargaining will become more powerful in next 10 years.
Blackburn 1971		1. As faculty get more power, students get less. 2. Potentially positive consequences outweigh the negative consequences.	1. Tight money and over supply of Ph. D's.

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Boyd 1971	1. Salary discontent. 2. Young faculty want benefits now, not later. 3. Statewide systems which affect autonomy. 4. Merit pay. 5. "Inferiority complex" of those in lower tier institutions. 6. The pluralism of society.	1. Enlarged bureaucracy. 2. Centralization. 3. Loss of faculty control. 4. Senates may fall.	1. More apt to see the emergence of unions for presidents than a trend away from unions
Bylsma and Blackburn 1971			1. In general unionists are younger and tend to distrust administrators. 2. Senior faculty are resisters.
Finkin 1971	1. If administration is autocratic, faculty will want more participation.		1. Senior faculty will lead the union movement.

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Gillis 1971			1. July 1971, 130 institutions had agents. 2. University system of New York with 15,000 in their unit. 3. 20 states had public employee laws. 4. NLRB gives private colleges the right to collective bargaining.
Hepler 1971		1. Moderate, rather conservative gains in salary and other benefits.	1. More high levels of responsibilities on all concerned may become more common.
Lipset and Ladd 1971	1. Junior faculty wanting their due.	1. When professors want to be collective decision makers, it leads to fragmentation.	

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
McConnell 1971	1. When governing boards interfere with normal process of governance.	1. Force administrators to give faculty their autonomy. 2. Complex problems, including the changing role of senates. 3. Conditions of tenure, promotion and appointments decided by senates, now are bargaining items.	1. Unions will develop unevenly among colleges and universities.
McHugh 1971		1. The scope of unionism will include both academic and policy issues in the past usually by senates, as well as economic matters.	
Provost 1971	1. State budget in California remains, collective bargaining will have to occur.		
Wollett 1971	1. Establishment of statewide systems of governance.		
Bakalis 1972			1. State legal regulations needed.

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Bylsma and Blackburn 1972		1. More representative, but tightly structured bureaucracy. 2. Impersonality in faculty. 3. Organization is more democratic. 4. Greater faculty control in their welfare. 5. Academic areas did not change much. (admissions, grading, etc.) 6. Now, more administrators than before collective bargaining.	1. The behavior of unions seems to be more than casual.
Duryea and Fisk 1972		1. Faculty benefits and improvement of decision making authority of the institution. 2. Stronger grievances produced. 3. Bargaining will take precedence over trustee policy. 4. New policies for tenure.	1. The NEA and AFT will dominate. 2. The balance of power between schools and the taxpayer will be affected. 3. More accountability of our colleges will be demanded.

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Howe 1972		1. Collective bargaining is adversary, not collegial, yet can be workable.	
Malamud 1972	1. Public school teachers getting good pay, lead to good pay of C.U.N.Y. faculty.		
Mortimer and Lozier 1972		1. Incompatability will result in some institutions, but in some a stronger and more effective bond between parties involved.	1. Blanket comments about outcomes of conflict are out of place at this time.
Pierce. 1972			1. 1968 - 10,000 faculty in unions. 2. 1972 - 100,000. 3. 29 states had public employee laws for collective bargaining.
Roth 1972		1. Bargaining can and will be the instrument that takes no "no" for an answer.	1. Wages and fringes are only fundamental, not limiting.

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Schinagl 1972	1. Typical ivory-tower leadership autocratic and unilateral downward communications. 2. Specifically, salary issues.	1. Possible outcomes-favorable pay scale use of evaluating team, and better communication.	1. After Syracuse and Cornell got NLRB rulings, the trend was set for "The Professional Associations."
Smith 1972			1. Collective bargaining has no effect on teachers salaries.
Tyler 1972	1. Self interest of faculties. 2. Public school teachers were getting good pay gains. 3. The financial plight of higher education causes the "speed up" or attempts to squeeze faculty to do more for less. 4. Job security. 5. Greater influence in governance.		1. Between 1962 and 1971 the AFT went from 60 to 250,000 members and AAUP started on campuses. 2. Unions are lobbying for more federal money to schools at all levels.
Aussieker and Garbarino 1973	1. Low-quality institutions. 2. Degree of participation in governance. 3. Work load. 4. Status and privileges.		

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Begin 1973			1. Collective bargaining has not altered governance in four-year colleges significantly.
Bloustein 1973	1. Fiscal stringencies.		1. Advise to administrators is to welcome and support collective bargaining.
Boyd 1973		1. Board power increase at expense of faculty. 2. Personnel policies more formal. 3. More uniform and centralized policies for personnel. 4. Increase in line-item budgets. 5. Increase accountability. 6. Student power decrease. 7. "Elite" faculty loss status and power.	

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Carnegie Commission 1973	1. Salaries. 2. Budgetary support for faculty interests. 3. More control of employment. 4. External authorities. 5. Policies on promotion and tenure.	1. Co-determination, collective bargaining or a combination. 2. Collective bargaining can provide agreement.	1. Unionization of prestigious school may be protective in nature not agressive. 2. As of 1973, 170 agents. 3. 250 institutes. 4. 3/4 in community colleges. 5. 75,000 members.
Carr and Van Eyck 1973	1. Faculty dissatisfied with power of senior professors. 2. Lack of effectiveness of faculty senates. 3. The autocratic nature of departmental governance.	1. Faculty have not had to accept greater workloads for higher salaries.	
Doeringer 1973		1. Generally raises salaries, its effects are for the poorly educated and black males. 2. Generally improves life-time economic mobility in craft and production work.	

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Duryea and Fisk 1973			1. An increase of political activities of higher educated faculty. 2. Unions will have to defend their value of service of their members to the general society instead of presidents and board members.
Hueppe 1973	1. Motivated by legal action in N.Y. by labor relations acts. 2. Desire to participate in grievance procedures and budgetary matters. 3. A voice in determining faculty destiny.	1. A total increase of 25% for Saint John University faculty in benefits. 2. Better grievance procedures. 3. Better terms of tenure and promotions. 4. Emphasis on collegiality. 5. Greater formulation in the decision-making process.	

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Ladd and Lipset 1973	1. Trends toward equalization, away from elitism of the 1960's. 2. Economic. 3. Structural. 4. Legal. 5. Current events of the 1960's. 6. Those in low tier of higher education want unionism. 7. Among high tier scholars, their intellectual deprivation, not economic or professional.	1. Intramural conflicts within institutions.	1. Those in the higher echelon of higher education are more ambiguous about collective bargaining. 2. Private sector least sympathetic to collective bargaining.
Tice 1973		1. Formation of basic differences between types of campuses. 2. Marked legal provisions differences. 3. Socio-political environmental differences. 4. Differences between new or "emerging" institutions and long settled traditional ones. 5. Financial health changes. 6. Increase in faculty evolvement in politics.	1. In reality, collective bargaining is not new, done in the past by adhoc and informal methods. 2. Alternatives can be found as the trend continues.

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Thornton 1973			1. Collective bargaining has an effect on the level of inter-district salaries for teachers.
Wollett 1973		1. Faculty should be aware of adversary relationships. 2. Benefits can arise from this relationship.	
Angell 1974		Advantages: 1. Better efficiency. 2. Equality of power. 3. Legal force. 4. Definitions of policy. 5. Consistency of service. 6. Strength-Collegiality. Disadvantages: 1. Increased costs. 2. Increased bureaucracy. 3. Power shifts, loss of autonomy. 4. Traditional rights and loss of. 5. Self-determination. 6. Involuntary contributions.	

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Birnbaum 1974			1. Five year period prior to 1973, faculty of union institutions got larger salaries boosts than those in non-union institutions.
Bodner 1974		1. Pointed out that the University of Hawaii contract was unsatisfactory. 2. Resulted in an N.Y.U. "No Agent" victory vote.	1. The NLRB rules that runoffs are between choices getting the highest votes. 2. The U.S. board previously said only between two unions.
Hedgepeth 1974	1. The legal provisions of the Taylor act, 1967, N.Y. 2. Grievance procedures. 3. Salary. 4. Merit pay. 5. Structural changes. 6. Teaching responsibilities.	1. Segmented, internally and externally. 2. Personnel relations were adversely affected.	
Ianni 1974	1. The bureaucracy causes a "that's your problem, syndrome" which leads to faculty unrest.	1. Thoughtful administrators must focus attention to matters of governance.	

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Lozier 1974	1. Administrators who interfere in procedures for tenure, promotions and appointments. 2. Salaries and the concept of unionism itself.	1. The adoption or rejection of unionism is clearly a choice of the faculty, not employer. 2. A "No Agent" vote victory.	
Lussier 1974	1. Growing financial difficulties. 2. Faculty cutbacks. 3. Not much participation in decision making. 4. Retrenchment of faculty positions. 5. Termination of tenured faculty.	1. "No Agent" vote, because of a sincere effort to give a new dean a chance to change things. 2. They received without a union, 5% raise, merit pay, benefits that were removed were reinstated.	
Olsen 1974	1. Governance.	1. Functional roles can be obscured. 2. The tradition of collegiality in colleges has become an anachronism. 3. Adversarial conditions in struggles for power possess a critical threat to academic freedom.	
Mintz 1974		1. On-going research needed to examine governance, attitudes, costs, grievances, and procedures.	1. During next 5 years 1 of 3 colleges will have a demand for unions.

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Schuster 1974		1. Most serious-institutional governance problems.	1. A catalyst destined to redistribute influence on campuses. 2. Trend toward establishing good models to guide governance.
Shulman 1974		1. Governance process will set up a more rational and just evaluation system.	
Chanin 1975		1. The balance of power might be set off by federal regulations on collective bargaining. 2. A fear of being usurped by federal government as seen by teachers.	1. Collective bargaining statutes by federal government. 2. Bills pending placing public employees under NLRA. 3. Consistency of laws between states regulate collective bargaining.

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Corson 1975		1. Polarized in firm adversarial positions between administration trustee and faculty. 2. Governance more explicit, more uniform and proceduralized. 3. Autonomy will be reduced. 4. Statewide faculties will merge. 5. Loss of individuality.	1. If present rate continues as noticed between 1967 and 1975, by 1980 as many as 1,000 institutions and 250,000 faculty will be unionized.
Garbarino 1975	1. Institutional changes the emergence of the multicampus, public institution, as opposed to the simple organizational structure in private colleges, 2. Functional change. 3. Strong bargaining laws. 4. "Emerging" colleges. 5. Environmental change-faculty desire to participate. 6. Salaries, a cause, but weak. 7. All 'causes' are not related in any "simple way,". 8. "Parity" of faculty in large institutions	1. A higher level of governance and levels of participation. 2. Educational conglomerates. 3. Emerging universities. 4. The "contagious" effect. 5. Better grievance procedures, but no great affect on Senates. 6. Affect on salaries in general, moderate. 7. Maintenance of high standard will become more difficult.	1. 56% of faculty in four-year institutions supported unionism in 1969, in 1972 it rose to over 60%, yet only 14% are in unions. 2. A phenomenom of public higher education, even after NLRA in 1970. 3. Only 2% of private institutions are organized 23% public. 4. Part of the general employee union movement. 5. Prestigious private universities are not likely to unionize.

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
James 1975			1. 30 or so states with bargaining laws. 2. 1975 busiest for legislation on collective bargaining. 40 states have laws pending. 3. In statewide structure the public employee relations commission make rulings. 4. Recent research shows teacher unions and public officials will work things out.
Lieberman 1975	1. Private sector bargaining began as a means of self-help.	1. Teachers may be caught between federal bureaucracy and domination by public employee unions.	1. Legislation varies from state to state.
Masters 1975	1. Job security.	1. Teachers' commitment to the organization is strengthened, thus strengthening the organization.	1. Clause in contracts dealing with job security. 2. Bargaining more sophisticated.

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Saint Leo College 1975	1. Gradual erosion of faculty fringe benefits. 2. No salary raise. 3. Financial allocation to administrators, not instruction. 4. Academic excellence poor. 5. Disregard of recommendation by a committee for long range goals. 6. Failure to consult faculty on tuition raises. 7. Unilateral decision by administration. 8. Working conditions not spelled out.		
Staub 1975		1. Must pay dues and join unions in some states to continue teaching.	1. AFT, AAUP, and NEA have gone like other unions-their own security rather than personal freedom.
Frohreick and Zuelke (Research notes, Phi Delta Kappan) 1976			1. Collective negotiation for salaries is not a long term solution, nor significant effect on salaries in Wisconsin.

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Heddinger 1976		1. Impact on the structure and function of representative government by legal acts regarding collective bargaining provision.	
Kemerer 1976		1. The nature of unions is to expand their areas of concern.	
Ladd and Lipset 1976			1. By 1976 294 institutions with 410 campuses and 95,000 faculty were unionized. 2. Most private institutions resist. 3. More research, profession-like oriented sector, (even in public schools) have resisted unionism.
Means 1976	1. A pattern of arbitrary decisions of administration.	1. Moderate gains for salary and working conditions as well as academic life.	

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Means and Semas 1976	1. Salaries. 2. Governance. 3. Tenure. 4. Promotion	1. Once a union is on your campus it's there to stay. 2. It may take 6-8 years for the collective bargaining to become stabilized. 3. Uneasy balance between senates and unions for control. 4. Collective bargaining increased outside influence also stimulated faculty to become involved.	1. As of 1976, 400 campuses have unions. 2. 350 public institutions. 3. Private college still resisting unions. 4. March 1975, NLRB was upheld in its right for jurisdiction over private colleges.
Sherer 1976	1. Tenure. 2. Academic Governance. 3. Salaries.	1. State monies for negotiating terms for taxpayers in collective bargaining.	1. Some unions and legislators are trying to change state law regarding dues-all must pay to work.
Bowen 1977		1. A strong "we-they" dichotomy between faculty and administration. 2. Strong adversary role of the union.	1. Future stress due to hiring stoppage and 90% now tenured. 2. New residency requirement for faculty in contract, may cause strikes in 1977.

RESEARCHER AND DATE	FACTORS AND ISSUES	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES	TRENDS
Chronicle of Higher Education 1977	1. Salary schedule. 2. Cost of living. 3. Termination policies.	1. Binding arbitration ordered by Alaska's Superior Court.	Since Sept. 1976 (on four-year colleges) 1. AAUP entered into seven elections, won one. 2. AFT entered into seven elections, won two. 3. NEA entered into four elections, won none. 4. Independent and other agents entered into three elections, won none. 5. AAUP-NEA entered into one election, won one. 6. "No Agent" choices won in six elections, three in the private sector.
Semas 1977		1. Student evaluations of professors may be limited by many faculty contracts. 2. No evidence was found that collective bargaining increased tuition and fees, but potential existed.	1. More concern by unions over student participation in faculty decisions. 2. AAUP has about 75,000, NEA about 64,000, and AFT 450,000 members. 3. Alliance proposed by NEA to AAUP.

Summary

The objective of this report was to identify a researched base for the future study of possible alternatives to the collective bargaining movement in higher education by examining the possible factors, consequences and trends of the collective bargaining movement in higher education. The major thrust of this review of literature was centered on the most current sources in the field of higher education.

The literature in Section One revealed that three general factors existed which were instrumental in influencing faculties in the collective bargaining movement in higher education.

Financial Factors (including salaries, funding and merit pay) were observed in 20 of the 30 studies, or in 66% of the literature surveyed.

Governance Factors (including structure, senates, decision-making issues and collegiality) were observed in 25 of the 30 studies, or in 75% of the literature surveyed.

Job Security Factors (including tenure, promotion and appointment issues as well as grievance procedures) were observed in 16 of the 30 studies, or in 45% of the literature surveyed.

The literature also pointed out the political views of faculty, self-interest and philosophical beliefs of faculty about unionism as factors relating to collective bargaining. Furthermore, faculties viewed the legal influences on state

and federal levels of our educational system as possible reasons for collective bargaining. Public school teachers' negotiations, on salary issues in particular, were also seen by some as a factor causing collective bargaining. Approximately one-third of the studies surveyed made mention of these concerns.

The literature in Section Two presented a dichotomy of viewpoints concerning the possible consequences of collective bargaining in higher education. These viewpoints ranged from the potentially positive features of collective bargaining to the seriously detrimental effects of unionism on the structure, governance, salaries, and future of our existing institutions of higher education.

Various alternatives to collective bargaining in higher education were examined, yet the research is still inconclusive as to their success or failure. Additionally, the research is also inconclusive on whether collective bargaining will solve the problems of faculties in higher education. Many researchers felt that whatever the final outcome is, the impact of collective bargaining represents a total commitment by all concerned and more than just a casual impact on our system of higher education in America today.

In Section Three, a definite trend towards faculty unionization in higher education was observed, especially from 1969 to 1975. Furthermore, it is evident that State laws relating to collective bargaining in 30 states, as well as laws presently pending in 40 states, will have a strong

influence on the trend of unionism in higher education.

Finally, there is a dearth of literature concerning collective bargaining in higher education, and even less literature examining the alternatives to collective bargaining chosen by some faculties to work out their problems. However, these alternatives must and can be examined by analyzing colleges and universities where collective bargaining has been rejected.

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